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Abstract
External recruiting at least weakly improves the quality of the pool
of applicants, but the incentive implications are less clear. Using a
contest model, this paper investigates the pure incentive e¤ects of ex-
ternal recruiting. Our results show that if workers are heterogeneous,
the opening of a rms career system may lead to a homogenization
of the pool of contestants and, thus, encourage the rms high abil-
ity workers to exert more e¤ort. If this positive e¤ect outweighs the
discouragement of low ability workers, the rm will benet from exter-
nal recruiting. If, however, the discouragement e¤ect dominates the
homogenization e¤ect, the rm should disregard external recruiting.
In addition, product market competition makes opening of the career
system less attractive for a rm since it increases the incentives of its
competitorsworkers and hence strengthens the competitors.
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1 Introduction
External recruitment of workers is frequently applied by rms (e.g., for lack
of appropriate internal candidates). At rst sight, this observation seems
puzzling since, contrary to outsiders, internal candidates have accumulated
rm-specic human capital. In addition, by recruiting externally, the rm
harms its reputation of honoring good performance of its workers via job-
promotion to higher hierarchy levels. As a consequence, career incentives of
internal workers may be destroyed so that the workers optimally react by
reducing their e¤orts or even deciding to quit. Practitioners like the human
resource expert John Sullivan, former Chief Talent O¢ cer at Agilent and
responsible for over 40,000 employees, question this view. He speculates that
external recruitment may have positive incentive e¤ects: "It keeps our em-
ployees on the edge because they know they must compete against outsiders
for jobs" (Sullivan 1999). Moreover, expanding the pool of applicants by
external job candidates at least weakly improves the pools average quality
and, therefore, leads to a better sta¢ ng than without external applicants.
Whereas the last argument improving the pool of applicants is quite
obvious, the incentive implications of external recruiting are not straightfor-
ward. In our paper, we use a contest model to investigate these incentive
e¤ects. In a rst step, the rm decides on whether allowing external workers
to apply or not and then chooses optimal contest prizes. Thereafter, the
relevant pool of workers either only internal workers or internal as well as
external workers competes for a vacant position in a recruitment contest.
To focus on the pure incentive view, we assume that external candidates do
not have superior talents. Thus, if a rm admits external candidates, the
well-known benet of improving the pool of applicants cannot play any role.
The results of the model show under which conditions a rm prots from
opening its career system to outsiders and when not. If the rms current
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workforce is heterogeneous, a purely internal competition for vacant positions
can be rather weak. For example, if workers have very di¤erent talents and if
they know each other for a long time (e.g., as members of the same entrance
cohort) internal career competition will be rather low since everybody knows
the presumable winner. We show that allowing external workers to apply in
such a situation can make the competition stronger, even if the outsiders
talents are observable by the internal workers. Expanding the pool of ap-
plicants leads to a discouragement of a rms workforce but possibly also to
a more homogeneous eld of applicants, which increases incentives. If this
advantage dominates discouragement, the rm will optimally decide in favor
of external recruiting.
We consider two rms employing heterogeneous workers. Workers have
either a high or a low ability. If a rm has to ll a vacancy and thinks
about external recruiting, it must keep the following externalities in mind:1
Since the number of workers competing for the vacant position increases,
external recruiting discourages own high-ability and low-ability workers. If
the ability di¤erence between the two types of workers is su¢ ciently large
and the number of high-ability workers exceeds a critical value, then the low-
ability workers will be completely discouraged and remain passive. Only the
high-ability workers will hence be active in the competition. These workers
incentives are boosted by the homogenization of the e¤ective set of players.
If this advantage outweighs the lost incentives of the low-ability workers, the
hiring rm will admit external applicants from a pure incentive perspective.
Otherwise, disregarding external candidates will be optimal for the rm.
This paper completely focuses on incentives. Including the quality of the
recruiting decision (i.e., the ability of the worker that is assigned to the vacant
position) would further strengthen the argument for external recruiting, even
if external candidates do not have superior talents: Without external candi-
1See Konrad (2009), chapter 5, on other externalities in contests.
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dates, both internal low-ability and internal high-ability workers may have
a positive probability of being promoted. If, as in the situation described
above, allowing external workers to apply discourages low-ability workers,
the vacant position is lled with a high-ability worker for sure.
Our results o¤er some testable implications with regard to inside versus
outside recruiting: Given our ndings, we would expect that rms with a
more homogeneous workforce are less prone to recruit higher-level positions
from outside. The reason is that in these rms internal competition for pro-
motion is already strong. A more homogeneous workforce could for instance
be the result of extensive screening when recruiting junior employees. Such
scrutiny in the selection of juniors can be found in industries like top man-
agement consulting and large law rms. We would thus expect to nd less
recruitment from outside in these industries, a prediction that is supported
by empirical evidence (see, e.g., Wilkins and Gulati (1998) on promotion-to-
partnership tournaments in large law rms). Clearly, this prediction can be
diluted if outsiders o¤er additional benets such as bringing with them an
important client base.
In addition, our model predicts that an outsider who enters the rm
should have a higher ability than the average inside worker. The reason is
that opening a rms career system for outsiders only attracts high ability
external workers to compete with insiders. Thus, any external candidate who
wins the competition will be of high ability whereas inside the rm there are
both, low and high ability workers. There exists anecdotal evidence that,
indeed, external recruits are more productive than internal hires on average
(see, e.g., Baker et al. 1994).
In the nal part of the paper, we address those externalities in recruiting
that arise if rms serve the same product market. If the two rms A and
B compete for the same customers but only rm A has a vacant position,
this rm A is less likely to allow for external applications compared to the
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basic model with separate product markets. Under product market compe-
tition, opening of As career system for external workers generates a positive
externality for the other rm B. The workforce of rm B gets incentives
for free, which makes B a stronger competitor to A in the product market.
Consequently, external recruiting becomes less attractive for rm A.
Our theoretical result predicts that hiring from outside will be less fre-
quent if product market competition is more intense. This theoretical nd-
ing is supported by the empirical study of Bayo-Moriones and Ortín-Ángel
(2006), who analyze the recruitment and promotion decisions of 653 Spanish
rms. They nd that the degree of competition has a positive and statisti-
cally highly signicant impact on the use of internal promotions. The authors
conclude: "Further theoretical research is needed to understand why prod-
uct market competition so strongly enhances the use of internal promotions"
(p. 466). Our model o¤ers a possible explanation rms focus on inter-
nal promotions under intense product market competition to avoid positive
externalities on rival rms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We start with a
brief overview of the related literature. In Sections 3 and 4, the basic model
is described and solved. Section 5 considers product market competition.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the previous work on contests,2 in particular to those
contest papers that also address competition between heterogeneous con-
testants. For such setting, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz
(1983) and OKee¤e et al. (1984) have argued that handicapping the more
able contestants can increase overall incentives. However, this kind of hand-
2For an overview see Konrad (2009).
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icap is only possible when the ability of each worker is known to the rm.
In our setting, the rm cannot observe workers individual abilities, which
renders the use of handicaps impossible. We show that the rm has another
possibility to create a more balanced contest when only the distribution of
types in- and outside the rm is known: By allowing external candidates to
apply, internal low ability workers will be discouraged and incentives for the
remaining high ability workers are increased.
Cornes and Hartley (2005) analyze asymmetric contests, applying a gen-
eral form of the Tullock contest-success function. They show that, depending
on the degree of heterogeneity among the players, only the strongest con-
testants are active in equilibrium. As Baye et al. (1996) and Siegel (2009,
2010) point out, a similar nding also holds for the all-pay auction with
complete information. In equilibrium, only the strongest contestants choose
positive e¤orts with a positive probability.
This intuitive nding that a more homogeneous pool of contestants leads
to stronger competition and higher e¤orts in equilibrium has also been con-
rmed empirically. For instance, the importance of a competitive balance
in sports leagues has been widely acknowledged. This can be seen, e.g., from
the prevalence of policies which aim at achieving that balance. Examples
include the rookie draft systemin sports leagues such as the NFL which
gives weaker teams an advantage in hiring new talent and in the elaborate
revenue sharing rules for broadcasting revenues found in many sports. See,
Szymanski (2003) and Szymanski and Késenne (2004) for details on these
and other examples.
The contest literature has studied many ways to homogenize the pool of
contestants, such as head starts, bid-caps, handicaps or excluding (strong)
contestants.3 We contribute to this literature by giving a converse to the
3See, e.g., Baye et al. (1993), Che and Gale (1998), Kirkegaard (2008, 2012) and the
references therein.
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exclusion results of, e.g., Baye et al. (1993): We show that including addi-
tional contestants whose e¤orts do not count towards overall e¤orts increase
competition to the designers advantage. Yet unlike excluding particular
contestants it does not require knowledge of contestantsidentities from the
designer. We consider a contest which is not perfectly discriminating, con-
cretely, a Tullock-type contest. Our results can however be expected to be
robust with respect to the choice of contest model. Consider for instance
an all-pay auction as in Baye et al. (1993) where contestants have unit ef-
fort costs and where the two strongest contestants have valuations vH and
vL < vH for winning. In this case, overall e¤orts are given by
vL
2

1 +
vL
vH

2
hvL
2
; vL
i
:
Then, by an e¤ect parallel to the one in our model, including another con-
testant with valuation vH whose e¤orts do not benet the designer leads to
total e¤orts of vH=2 from the previous contestants which is an improvement
if vH   vL is su¢ ciently large.
3 The Basic Model
We consider two adjacent hierarchy levels in two rms A and B. There is
a set N of n employees working at the lower hierarchy level in either of the
rms. Workers are either of high-ability type H or of low-ability type L. For
T = L;H and F = A;B we denote by NFT the set of all type T workers
employed in the lower hierarchy level of rm F and denote its cardinality by
nFT . The numbers nFT are common knowledge of all players, but only the
individual worker knows his own type. In other words, we have asymmetric
information in the sense that workers exactly know their respective types but
the corresponding rm only knows the relative frequency of types. Moreover,
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we denote by NF the set of all workers employed in the lower hierarchy level
of rm F , and by NT the set of all type T workers employed at one of the
rms lower hierarchy level. The respective cardinalities are denoted by nF
and nT and we assume that nF  2 for F = A;B. The two rms A and
B and all n workers are assumed to be risk neutral. Workers are protected
by limited liability so that their wages must be non-negative. Furthermore,
each worker has a zero reservation value.
Nature chooses one of the two rms randomly to have a vacant position
at the higher hierarchy level that must be lled. The respective rm F can
either promote one of its nF internal candidates or ll the vacancy with an
external hire. In other words, rms A and B have comparable technologies
in the sense that working on the lower level of either rm qualies a worker
to ll a vacancy at the higher level of both rms.
The n workers choose non-negative e¤orts ei at personal cost ei=ti with
ti 2 ftL; tHg, tH > tL > 0, reecting worker is talent or ability (i 2 N).
Hence, rm F has nFL (nFH) workers of talent tL (tH). Workers e¤orts
ei (i 2 NF ) lead to the value v
 P
i2NF ei

for employer F with v () > 0,
v0 () > 0, limx!1 v0 (x) = 0 and v00 () < 0. In words, the value function is
monotonically increasing, strictly concave with vanishing increments as well
as strictly positive for all feasible arguments. Neither e¤orts ei nor the value
v
 P
i2NF ei

are directly observable by the employer. For example, the rms
value of workerse¤orts will be realized in the future or it corresponds to a
rather complex good or service whose quality cannot be directly determined.4
However, an employer can use a coarse signal on relative performance
for lling the vacant position. With probability pi (e1; : : : ; ei; : : : ; em), this
signal tells rm F that worker i has performed best, so that worker i gets
the contract o¤er for the vacant position. Here, m denotes the number of
workers that are included in the employers chosen career system (i.e., either
4See MacLeod (2003), p. 219, on this point.
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m = n or m = nF ). Let M denote the set of these workers. In any case,
the rm does not have information on who has performed second-best and so
on. This kind of coarse signal particularly holds for those situations where
the m workers compete against each other in the same market with only the
winner becoming visible. For example, we can think of competition between
salesmen for a certain key customer where the only public information is
the identity of the salesman who is accepted by the customer. As a second
example, we can imagine a situation with di¤erent industrial researchers
competing in the same innovation race.5 Competition immediately stops
when one of them has made the innovation. In that situation, it is di¢ cult
to know who would have succeeded next. Given these examples, the value
function v
 P
i2NF ei

indicates that, from the rms point of view, nishing
the observable task (e.g., acquiring a key customer or making an innovation)
is only one valuable aspect of workerse¤ort choices.
To simplify matters, we adopt the signal structure that is frequently used
in the literature on innovation races (e.g., Loury 1979, Dasgupta and Stiglitz
1980, Denicolo 2000, Baye and Hoppe 2003):6
pi (e1; : : : ; ei; : : : ; em) =
8<:
eiP
j2M ej
if
P
j2M ej > 0
1
m
otherwise.
In order to focus on di¤erent rms that compete with their career systems
5If an industrial researcher is hired from outside, such employee poaching can be in-
terpreted as a form of knowledge spillover, which is very successful in high-technology
industries; see, e.g., Levin (1988). However, in our setting employee poaching is used as a
pure incentive device.
6Let G (ijei) = 1   exp ( h  ei  i) denote the probability that i succeeds (i.e., ac-
quires a certain key customer or solves a certain problem by making an innovation) before
time i and g (ijei) the corresponding density. Let the workers success times be sto-
chastically independent. is conditional probability of succeeding rst is P (i winsji) =Q
j2Mnfig P (j > i) =
Q
j2Mnfig [1 G (ijej)] = exp( h  i
P
j2Mnfig ej). Thus,
is unconditional winning probability is
R1
0
exp( hi
P
j2Mnfig ej)g (ijei) di =R1
0
hei exp( hi
P
j2M ej)di = ei=(
P
j2M ej), which is the well-known contest-success
function suggested by Tullock (1980).
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in the same labor market we assume that each rm can credibly commit to
assign the best performer to the higher hierarchy level in case of a vacancy.7
Moreover, we neglect other possible incentive schemes. The only possibility of
a rm to generate incentives is to design a recruiting contest for the vacant
position at the higher level. Here, rm F can either restrict competition
to internal candidates or widen worker competition by accepting external
candidates as well. To install a recruiting contest, the rm announces a wage
w  0 that is attached to the vacant job.8 The best performing worker gets
this job. All other workers get zero wages as optimal contest loser prizes
since workers are protected by limited liability and have zero reservation
values.9 We concentrate on incentive issues and, at the end of Section 4,
shortly comment on the consequences of job assignment on rm prots.
We can summarize the time schedule of the basic model as follows:
1 2 3 4 5
-
nature rm rm workers payments
chooses decides on chooses choose are made
vacancy external wage w e¤orts
in A or B recruiting ei
At the rst stage of the game, nature randomly selects one of the rms A
and B to have a vacancy on the higher hierarchy level. At stage 2, this rm
7E.g., the signal on the best performer is veriable.
8Note that the wage does not depend on whether an insider or an outsider lls the
vacancy. First, large corporations often use wages being attached to jobs to avoid a
huge number of individual negotiations with their workers. Second, in the given setting
workers do not di¤er from the viewpoint of the two rms and a third party so that equal
opportunity laws would prohibit unequal treatment of internal and external workers; see
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) on contests and equal opportunity laws.
9In other words, since the rm does not have more information on workersranking,
any positive loser prize would only increase the rms labor costs and decrease workers
incentives.
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F has to make the policy decision whether to accept external candidates or
not. For the chosen career system with or without external recruiting the
rm solves
max
w0
v
X
i2NF
ei

  w (1)
at stage 3. The optimal wage attached to the vacant job also describes the
contract o¤ered to each of the internal workers at the lower hierarchy level.
Any worker will accept a feasible contract with w  0 since workers have
zero reservation values but a non-negative payo¤ when participating in the
career game and choosing zero e¤ort. Thus, we do not have to care for the
workersparticipation constraints when solving the game. In stage 4, all n
workers observe the rms recruiting policy (including w) and simultaneously
choose e¤orts to compete for the vacant position. Finally, the best performing
worker that is assigned to the vacant higher-level job gets w, whereas the
other workers get zero. The rm F that has lled its vacancy earns prot
(1) and the other rm F^ 2 fA;BgnfFg receives v
P
i2NF^ ei

. After having
solved the game of the basic model we will turn to the case of both rms
competing in the same product market.
4 Solution to the Basic Model
We solve the game by backwards induction starting with stage 4, where the
m workers simultaneously choose their e¤orts. Of course, if workers of rm
F^ cannot apply for the vacant position since rm F has excluded candidates
from outside they will optimally choose zero e¤orts in order to save e¤ort
costs. However, workers of rm F are always included in the recruiting
contest. Let mH denote the number of H-type workers and mL the number
of L-type workers that are allowed to apply for the vacant job with wage
w > 0. We obtain the following result:
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Proposition 1 There exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium in which
workers of the same type choose identical e¤ort levels. If tH (mH   1) 
mHtL, then L-type workers choose eL = 0 in equilibrium and H-type workers
eH =
mH 1
m2H
tHw, otherwise
eL = w
tHtL (m  1) (mHtL   (mH   1) tH)
(mHtL +mLtH)
2 and (2)
eH = w
tHtL (m  1) (mLtH   (mL   1) tL)
(mHtL +mLtH)
2 : (3)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that we have two possible outcomes at the contest
stage. Either outcome is symmetric in the sense that H-type workers choose
identical e¤orts and L-type workers choose identical e¤orts. If the H-type
workers are su¢ ciently more able than the L-type workers, the latter ones
will be completely discouraged and drop out of the competition by choosing
zero e¤ort.10 The larger the number of H-type workers the more likely will
be this outcome. In particular, for mH ! 1 the L-type workers will even
drop out if the H-type workers have only a marginally higher ability since
condition tH  mHmH 1tL becomes tH  tL. The number of H-type workers
also discourages the high-ability workers. They will not drop out, but their
equilibrium e¤ort level monotonically decreases in mH . Recall that either
mH = nAH + nBH or mH = nFH . Hence, if L-type workers drop out under
pure internal competition they will drop out as well if rm F opens its career
system for external hires, whereas the opposite result does not necessarily
hold. Altogether, opening the career system to outsiders can generate strong
externalities by discouraging the weak internal workers.
10Note that this result is not specic to the Tullock contest-success function. It is due
to the fact that marginal e¤ort costs are positive at zero. If marginal e¤ort costs were
zero at zero e¤ort, workers would not drop out but the discouragement e¤ect would be
qualitatively the same.
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If tH (mH   1) < mHtL, the recruiting contest will have an equilibrium
with both types of workers exerting positive e¤orts. From (2) and (3) we
can see that equilibrium e¤orts increase in the wage w and that eH > e

L
since mLtH   (mL   1) tL > mHtL   (mH   1) tH . Moreover, the level of a
workers equilibrium e¤ort crucially depends on two factors the number of
contestants and the degree of heterogeneity between the workers. These two
factors can be highlighted by considering them separately. In order to point
out the impact of the number of contestants, let mH = mL = m. In that
case, we obtain
eL + e

H =
wtHtL (2 m  1)
m2 (tL + tH)
;
which is clearly decreasing in m. Thus, analogously to the case of a corner
solution considered in the paragraph before, each worker is discouraged if the
number of opponents increases.
To emphasize the role of heterogeneity let, for illustrating purposes,mH =
mL = 1.11 The sum of equilibrium e¤orts boils down to
eL + e

H = w
tHtL
tL + tH
:
Hence, for a given amount of collective talent, tL + tH , workerse¤orts are
maximized if heterogeneity diminishes (i.e., tL = tH). This nding is quite
intuitive and also in line with results in other contest models: The closer
the race between the contestants the more e¤ort each player will choose in
equilibrium. Both e¤ects discouragement by a larger number of contestants
and encouragement by a small degree of heterogeneity among the workers 
are crucial for rm Fs decision whether to allow external recruiting or not.
Anticipating the workersbehavior in the recruiting contest, at stages 2
and 3 rm F solves the design problem for lling the vacancy at its higher
11Since by assumption of the basic model, nFL + nFH  2, we are in a situation where
external workers are excluded.
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hierarchy level. Let V denote the inverse of the marginal value function v0 ().
Then we get the following results:
Proposition 2 Let rm F strictly prefer a positive wage.12 F allows exter-
nal workers to apply for the vacancy i¤
tH
nFH   1
nFH
< tL  tH nH   1
nH
and (4)
(nF   1)n2H
nFH (nH   1)nFL  
nFH
nFL
<
tH
tL
: (5)
In that case, F optimally chooses
w = 1  V (1) with 1 = n
2
H
nFH (nH   1) tH : (6)
In all other cases, F does not admit external applications and chooses
w = 2  V (2) with 2 =
8<: nFH(nFH 1)tH if tL  tH nFH 1nFHnFH tL+nFLtH
tH tL(nF 1) otherwise.
(7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark There exist feasible parameter constellations that satisfy (4) and (5)
at the same time. Consider, for example, nF^H = nFL =  > 0 and nFH = 1
with F^ denoting the other rm. For this parameter constellation, conditions
(4) and (5) boil down to
0 < tL  tH 
1 + 
and tL < tH
 
( + 1)2   1 :
There are feasible values of tL and tH that satisfy both inequalities for any
positive integer .
12Hence, we must have that v0 (0) min
n
nFH 1
nFH
; tL(nFH+nFL 1)nFHtL+nFLtH ;
nFH(nH 1)
n2H
o
tH > 1.
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From Proposition 1 we know that L-type workers will drop out and choose
zero e¤ort, if the number of H-type workers is su¢ ciently large. Hence, from
the perspective of rm F we can di¤erentiate between three cases (1) the
number of internal H-type workers is so large that L-type workers even drop
out without external competition, (2) L-type workers only drop out if F
opens the career system for external candidates but not under pure internal
competition, (3) L-type workers never drop out. Proposition 2 shows that
only in case (2) rm F may be interested in allowing external applications.
In that case, F strictly benets from the strong externalities induced by the
outsiders. F will prefer an open career system if the increased e¤ort levels of
its H-type workers exceed the lost e¤orts of its L-type workers who become
completely discouraged and drop out. In particular, three e¤ects are at work
that crucially inuence rm Fs decision to allow external recruiting: (i) Since
the L-type workers drop out, there is pure homogeneous competition among
H-type workers. As equilibrium e¤orts are highest the more homogeneous the
players, F strictly prots from an active homogeneous workforce. (ii) Firm
F loses the valuable e¤orts of his L-type workers, who exert zero e¤orts. (iii)
Allowing external candidates changes the number of active contestants. In
general, a single worker will be discouraged and, hence, supply less e¤ort
the larger the number of his opponents. Whereas F strictly benets from
(i) and su¤ers from (ii) the direction of this third e¤ect is not clear. On
the one hand, the number of active players decreases as L-type workers drop
out, which encourages each remaining H-type worker. On the other hand,
additional H-type workers from the other rm enter the competition, which
increases the number of active players.
We can identify these three e¤ects when looking at condition (5).13 This
inequality is more likely to be satised if tH is rather large and tL rather small.
The larger tH the more F will prot from enhanced competition between his
13Condition (4) only states that we are in case (2).
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H-type workers. The smaller tL the smaller will be Fs losses from his L-
type workers, who become completely passive. A similar interpretation can
be obtained for nFL: Condition (5) is equivalent to
tL (nFH + nFL   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
< nFH
nH   1
n2H
:
Di¤erentiating the left-hand side with respect to nFL gives
@
@nFL

tL (nFH + nFL   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)

=
nFHtL

tL   nFH   1
nFH
tH

(tLnFH + nFLtH)
2 ;
which is strictly positive according to (4). Hence, the smaller nFL the smaller
will be Fs losses from completely discouraging all of his L-type workers and
the more F will tend to open its career system for external workers. Finally,
the left-hand side of (5) is non-decreasing (and for nH > 2 strictly increasing)
in nH . This nding is quite intuitive, following e¤ect (iii) above. Recall that
nH also contains the number of H-type workers of the other rm, nF^H . The
larger this number, the larger will be the number of active contestants when
allowing external candidates to apply. Since the equilibrium e¤ort level of a
single H-type worker decreases in the number of opponents when the eld of
players is completely homogeneous (see Proposition 1), a larger value of nF^H
makes opening the career system for rm F less attractive.
The argument given at the end of the last paragraph exactly explains
why rm F does not open its career system in case (1) described above. The
only e¤ect of such opening would be a discouragement of the internal H-
type workers since mH increases from mH = nFH to mH = nFH + nF^H . The
remaining case (3) deals with the scenario where L-type workers never give
up by choosing zero e¤orts. At rst sight, it is not clear whether opening
of the career system may be protable for F . Of course, allowing external
applications unambiguously increases the number of contestants, which dis-
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courages each internal worker. However, maybe the additional contestants
lead to a better mixture of workers so that the eld becomes more homoge-
neous. Proposition 2 shows that this possible advantage is not strong enough
to justify opening of the career system.
In this paper, we do not address the rms consequences of assigning a
worker with certain talent t to the vacant position at the higher hierarchy
level. However, since the vacant position is typically accompanied by higher
responsibility and inuence on rm prots, the rm should prefer t = tH
to t = tL for the new job holder. Note that given such preference the rm
additionally prots in case (2) from ensuring the assignment of an H-type
worker to the higher position. Since all L-type workers drop out of the
competition and, thus, have a zero probability of winning the contest, opening
the career system guarantees optimal selection of workers as a by-product.
Finally, equations (6) and (7) show that the workersabilities and the
numbers of di¤erent types of workers play an ambiguous role for rm Fs
choice of the optimal wage, w. This can be exemplarily seen from (6).
Note that V () is monotonically decreasing since the value function v is
increasing and concave. On the one hand, a high talent tH corresponds to
high equilibrium e¤orts and makes investing in incentives rather attractive
for F . On the other hand, marginal returns from e¤ort supply are decreasing
due to the concavity of the value function, which makes incentivizing workers
less attractive to F .
5 Product Market Competition
We now turn to the case where both rms compete in the same product
market. Again, rm F has to ll a vacancy and has to decide whether or not
to open its career system for the workers of its competitor F^ .
The basic structure of the model remains the same as in Section 3. How-
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ever, under product market competition, the prot of rm F does not only
depend on its own workerse¤orts but also on the e¤orts of its competitor F^s
workers. The higher the total e¤ort of the rival rms workforce, the lower
should be Fs prot. This e¤ect seems to be natural if rms directly com-
pete against each other. To model this e¤ect, rm F is assumed to maximize
prot
 
X
i2NF
ei  
X
j2NF^
ej

  w (8)
where the function  has the following properties:  is a monotonically
increasing, strictly positive, continuously di¤erentiable and bounded function
on R which is strictly concave on R+ and for which  (x)+ ( x) is constant
in x. The last assumption captures the idea that the two rms are competing
for a market of xed size.
Since the contest game between the workers remains the same, equilib-
rium e¤orts for a given wage w are still described by Proposition 1. As can
be seen from (8), the introduction of product market competition renders
external recruiting less attractive. The reason is that the recruiting contest
gives incentives to all participating workers, which includes the workforce of
the competing rm in case of external recruiting. Therefore, we can only
expect new insights for the case where the rm would open its career system
to external workers in the absence of competition, described by conditions
(4) and (5) of Proposition 2. Let 	 denote the inverse of function  0. Then
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that conditions (4) and (5) hold. Furthermore, let
rm F strictly prefer a positive wage. F still allows external workers to apply
despite product market competition i¤ nFH > nF^H and
(nF   1)n2H
(nFH   nF^H) (nH   1)nFL
  nFH
nFL
<
tH
tL
: (9)
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In that case, F optimally chooses
w = 3 	 (3) with 3 = n
2
H
(nFH   nF^H) (nH   1) tH
: (10)
Otherwise, F does not admit external applications and chooses a wage w
corresponding to the second case of (7) with V being replaced by 	.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that with product market competition two additional
conditions nFH > nF^H and inequality (9) need to hold for F to open up
its career system. Firm F now has to consider the negative externalities in
form of the career incentives for the workers in rm F^ . These externalities
only arise for H-type workers since the L-type workers in both rms will
be completely discouraged and drop out of the job-competition. Firm F
thus has to consider the number of H-type workers nF^H at the competing
rm, which yields the two additional conditions. If nFH < nF^H rm F^ will
gain more from career incentives than rm F since F^ employs more H-type
workers. In that case, rm F would unambiguously harm itself by opening
its career system for external hires. Thus, nFH > nF^H describes a necessary
condition for F to admit external candidates.
In addition, opening the career system requires condition (9) to hold.
Again, the number of H-type workers of the other rm F^ turns out to be
crucial. The larger nF^H the more the H-type workers in both rms will be
discouraged since the equilibrium e¤ort level of the H-type workers,
eH =
(nFH + nF^H)  1
(nFH + nF^H)
2 tHw;
decreases in nF^H . This e¤ect should harm rm F more than rm F^ because
of nFH > nF^H . Thus, the larger nF^H the less condition (9) should be satis-
ed. The comparison of conditions (5) and (9) shows that this conjecture is
19
correct. The only di¤erence between (5) and (9) is the replacement of nFH
by nFH   nF^H in the denominator of the rst expression at the left-hand
side. Hence, condition (9) is stricter than condition (5) so that under prod-
uct market competition rm F will open its recruiting system less often to
external applicants than without competition. Since the left-hand side of (9)
is monotonically increasing in nF^H , (9) is less likely to be satised for large
values of nF^H .
6 Conclusion
We have addressed two kinds of externalities that arise if a rm chooses ex-
ternal recruiting. First, opening the career system can lead to both negative
and positive externalities for worker competition. Negative externalities al-
ways arise since, for a given vacancy, the enlarged pool of applicants leads
to worker discouragement. Positive externalities are generated if external
recruiting induces a homogenization of active players which boosts the in-
centives of a rms high-ability workers. The rm prefers external recruiting,
if the positive externalities from homogenization dominate the negative ones
from worker discouragement. Second, there are externalities in case of prod-
uct market competition. Suppose there are two rms competing in the same
market. If one rm opens its career system for the workers of the other
rm, the latter one will prot from the incentives its workers receive with-
out paying for them. Thus, the second rm becomes a stronger competitor,
which harms the rst rm. Consequently, strong product market competition
makes opening of the career system less attractive for a rm.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
If eL1; : : : ; eLmL denote the e¤orts of the L-type workers and eH1; : : : ; eHmH
those of the H-type workers, L-type worker  will maximize
EUL (eL) =
eL
eL +
P
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
w   eL
tL
;
whereas H-type worker  chooses e¤ort eH to maximize
EUH (eH) =
eH
eH +
P
i2f1;:::;mLg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHgnfg eHj
w   eH
tH
:
If w > 0, there cannot be an equilibrium with each worker exerting zero e¤ort
because then one of the workers can switch to a marginal amount of positive
e¤ort and wins w for sure. Since each worker has a strictly concave objective
function, worker  either optimally chooses eL = 0 if EU
0
L (0)  0, or
eL > 0 with EU
0
L (e

L) = 0 if EU
0
L (0) > 0. In analogy, we obtain
eH
8<: = 0 if EU 0H (0)  0> 0 with EU 0H  eH = 0 if EU 0H (0) > 0:
Hence, a corner solution eL = 0 satisesP
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
eL +
P
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
2w  1tL ,
1P
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
w  1
tL
;
and an interior solution eL > 0
1P
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
w >
1
tL
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with eL being described by the rst-order conditionP
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
eL +
P
i2f1;:::;mLgnfg eLi +
P
j2f1;:::;mHg eHj
2w = 1tL : (11)
Next, we show that there is a unique equilibrium with all workers of
the same type choosing identical e¤ort levels. To show uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium we follow an approach put forward by Cornes and Hartley
(2005). Let E Pi2f1;:::;mLg eLi +Pj2f1;:::;mHg eHj. From (11) we know that
for eL > 0 we must have
E eL
E2
w = 1
tL
or
eL = E

1  E
wtL

:
Let eL (E)  max
n
E

1  E
wtL

; 0
o
, which is the unique possible equi-
librium value of eL given that the sum of all e¤ort levels is equal to E.
Similarly, dene eH (E)  max
n
E

1  E
wtH

; 0
o
. Then, a necessary con-
dition for (eL1; :::; eLmL ; eH1; :::; emH ) being an equilibrium is that the sum of
these e¤ort levels E is equal to the sum of the equilibrium e¤ort levels from
eL (E) and e

H (E). Formally, we must have:
E =
X
i2f1;:::;mLg
eLi (E) +
X
j2f1;:::;mHg
eHj (E),
1 =
X
i2f1;:::;mLg
max

1  E
wtL
; 0

+
X
j2f1;:::;mHg
max

1  E
wtH
; 0

: (12)
The RHS of (12) is decreasing in E; has value m > 1 for E = 0, and tends to
0 for E !1. Hence, a unique value E exists satisfying (12). Since eL (E)
and eH (E) constitute the unique equilibrium candidate for a given value E,
the unique equilibrium is given by eL(E
) and eH(E
). Thus there exists a
unique equilibrium and it has the property that all workers of the same type
choose identical e¤ort levels.
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Therefore, we have symmetric solutions in the sense of eL = e

L ( =
1; : : : ;mL) and eH = e

H ( = 1; : : : ;mH). The condition for the corner
solution eL = e

L = 0 boils down to
1
mHeH
w  1
tL
; (13)
and the conditions for an interior solution eL = e

L > 0 can be simplied to
1
mHeH
w >
1
tL
and (14)
(mL   1) eL +mHeH
(mLeL +mHe

H)
2 w =
1
tL
: (15)
Analogously, we obtain
1
mLeL
w  1
tH
(16)
for eH = e

H = 0, and
1
mLeL
w >
1
tH
and (17)
mLe

L + (mH   1) eH
(mLeL +mHe

H)
2 w =
1
tH
(18)
for eH = e

H > 0.
First, we can show by contradiction that a solution eL > 0 and e

H = 0
is not possible. For this solution (15) and (16) must hold at the same time.
Inserting eH = 0 into (15) yields e

L = [tL (mL   1)w] =m2L. Plugging into
(16) and rewriting gives tHmL  tL (mL   1), a contradiction.
However, a corner solution with eL = 0 and e

H > 0 is possible. Combining
(13) with (18) and eL = 0 leads to
eH =
(mH   1) tH
m2H
w and tH  mH
mH   1tL (mH > 1);
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where the last inequality is clearly satised for mH !1.
Finally, an interior solution with eL > 0 and e

H > 0 is described by the
two rst-order conditions (15) and (18). Straightforward computations yield
(2) and (3).
Proof of Proposition 2:
If nL = 0 or nH = 0, competing workers are homogeneous irrespective of
whether rm F allows external applicants or not. In this situation, F strictly
benets from excluding external hires since a workers individual equilibrium
e¤ort decreases in the number of contestants.
The other possible situations can be divided into three cases. Case (1)
deals with tL  tH nFH 1nFH . Then L-type workers drop out with and without
external recruiting (see Proposition 1). F solves
max
w
v

nFH
nFH   1
n2FH
tHw

  w
when excluding external workers, and
max
w
v

nFH
nH   1
n2H
tHw

  w
if it allows external workers to apply. Note that we have an immediate result
without solving for the optimal wages: Since (nFH   1) =n2FH  (nH   1) =n2H ,
the rst objective function always lies above the second one so that rm F
prefers to exclude external candidates. Because the rms objective function
is strictly concave, the optimal wage is described by the rst-order condition
v0

nFH   1
nFH
tHw


nFH   1
nFH
tH = 1;
given that v0 (0) nFH 1
nFH
tH > 1 guarantees an interior solution. The rst-order
condition can be rewritten to the expression given in the rst line of (7).
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Case (2) is characterized by tH nFH 1nFH < tL  tH
nH 1
nH
. Now, L-type work-
ers drop out with external recruiting but do not drop out without external
hires. Using (2) and (3), under pure internal career competition rm F
maximizes
v (nFH  eH + nFL  eL)  w = v

tHtL (nF   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
w

  w: (19)
If F additionally includes external candidates, his L-type workers will drop
out and F maximizes
v

nFH
nH   1
n2H
tHw

  w: (20)
Firm F will prefer external recruiting, if
nFH
nH   1
n2H
>
tL (nF   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
;
which can be rewritten to (5). If F prefers to allow external job candidates
it will maximize (20), leading to (6). Otherwise, F maximizes (19), yielding
the expression in the second line of (7).
Case (3) deals with tH nH 1nH < tL. Now, L-type workers will not drop
out irrespective of whether rm F allows external applicants or not. Thus,
the only e¤ect of opening the career system is an increase in the number
of L-type and H-type contestants without inuencing the number of e¤ort
spending internal workers. We can show that such opening does not pay
for the rm since the negative incentive e¤ect of an increased number of
contestants always dominates a possibly positive incentive e¤ect by a less
heterogeneous eld of contestants (see the additional pages for the referees).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let conditions (4) and (5) be fullled. As before, L-type workers drop out
25
with external recruiting but do not drop out without external hires. Using
(2) and (3), under pure internal career competition rm F maximizes in
analogy to (19):
 (nFH  eH + nFL  eL)  w =  

tHtL (nF   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
w

  w:
If F additionally invites external job applicants, all L-type workers will drop
out and F maximizes
 (nFH  eH   nF^H  eH)  w =  

(nFH   nF^H)
nH   1
n2H
tHw

  w: (21)
Thus, for any positive wage w rm F will prefer external recruiting i¤
(nFH   nF^H)
nH   1
n2H
>
tL (nF   1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
:
This condition can only be satised for nFH > nF^H . In that case, it can be
rewritten to (9), and F maximizes (21) leading to (10). Otherwise, we are
in the analogous situation as without product market competition where F
maximizes (19), yielding the expression in the second line of (7) with function
V being replaced by 	.
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Additional pages for the referees on Proposition 2, case (3):
Let eL (mL;mH) and e

H (mL;mH) denote the equilibrium e¤orts being de-
scribed by (2) and (3). We can rst show that increased heterogeneous com-
petition via opening the career system leads to a decrease of internal workers
e¤orts for almost all feasible parameter constellations. For eL (nFL; nFH) we
obtain14
@eL (nFL; nFH)
@nFH
= 
1  [nFHtL   (2nFH + nFL   2) tH ]
with 
1 =   (nFLtH   (nFL   1) tL) > 0 and  = wtHtL
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
3
@eL (nFL; nFH)
@nFL
= 
2  [nFHtL   (2nFH + nFL   2) tH ]
with 
2 =   (nFHtL   (nFH   1) tH) > 0:
Only the term in square brackets of each derivative can be negative. For
the derivatives to be positive we must have that nFH > 2nFH + nFL   2 ,
nFH+nFL < 2, which is impossible because each rm has at least two workers
at the lower tier of the hierarchy. For eH (nFL; nFH) the comparative statics
read as
@eH (nFL; nFH)
@nFH
= 
1  [nFLtH   (2nFL + nFH   2) tL]
@eH (nFL; nFH)
@nFL
= 
2  [nFLtH   (2nFL + nFH   2) tL] :
Similar to the derivatives before, only the term in square brackets can be
negative. It is positive i¤
nFLtH > (2nFL + nFH   2) tL:
14Of course, nFL and nFH are integers. However, for nFL and nFH being not too small
eL (nFL; nFH) and e

H (nFL; nFH) are monotonically decreasing in the number of workers
of both types so that the results on marginal changes of these numbers carry over to
discrete changes.
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Since the talent of H-type workers is restricted to tH nFH 1nFH < tL, to be true
the inequality must at least be satised for tH = nFHnFH 1tL. Inserting into the
inequality yields
(2  nFH) (nF   1) > 0;
which only holds for nFH = 1 and nFL  1, or for nFH = 0 and nFL  2.
Altogether, the comparative-static results point out that for nFH  2 it
does not pay o¤ for F to enlarge worker competition by allowing external ap-
plications: Internal workers become discouraged, irrespective of the mixture
of the two rmsworkers at the lower hierarchy level. However, we still have
to check out whether increasing eH (nFL; nFH) by external recruiting under
nFH = 1 or nFH = 0 outweighs lower values of eL (nFL; nFH).
We start with the case of nFH = 1. Under pure internal recruiting, rm
F maximizes
v

tHtLnFL
tL + nFLtH
w

  w:
Allowing external applicants would lead to objective function
v

tHtL (nH + nL   1) (tL + tHnFL + (tH   tL) (nL   nHnFL))
(nHtL + nLtH)
2 w

  w:
Thus, F will open its career system for external workers if and only if
nFL
tL + nFLtH
<
(nH + nL   1) (tL + tHnFL + (tH   tL) (nL   nHnFL))
(nHtL + nLtH)
2 :
(22)
Note that this inequality does not hold for nH = 1. Hence, we must have
nH  2. Di¤erentiating RHS(22) with respect to nH yields
(2  nH) tL + nL (tH   2tL)
(nHtL + nLtH)
3 (tL + tHnFL + (tH   tL) (nL   nHnFL))
  (tH   tL)nFL (nH + nL   1)
(nHtL + nLtH)
2 ;
31
which is negative because nH  2 and tH < 2tL (since tH < nHnH 1tL;8nH 
2). Therefore, if (22) can be satised, it must at least hold for the lower limit
nH = 2. Inserting into (22) and substituting for nL = nFL + nF^L (again, F^
indicates the other rm) gives
nFL
tL + nFLtH
<
(nFL + nF^L + 1) (tL + tHnFL + (tH   tL) (nF^L   nFL))
(2tL + (nFL + nF^L) tH)
2 :
(23)
Di¤erentiating RHS(23) with respect to nF^L leads to
(tH   2tL) [(nFL + 1) tHnFL + nF^L (2tL + tH (nFL   1))]
(2tL + (nFL + nF^L) tH)
3 ;
which is negative due to tH < 2tL. Thus, if (23) holds, it must at least be
true for nF^L = 1. Inserting into (23) and rearranging gives

(tH   tL)n3FL + (3nFL   2) tL

tH+(2tH   tL) tLn2FL+

(nFL   1) t2H + 2t2L

nFL < 0;
which cannot be true. To sum up, F will prefer to exclude external workers
from competing with internal ones if nFH = 1.
Finally, we have to consider the case of nFH = 0. If rm F excludes
applicants from the other rm, it will maximize
v

tL (nFL   1)
nFL
w

  w:
Under the external-recruiting policy, F maximizes
v

nFL
tHtL (nH + nL   1) (nHtL   (nH   1) tH)
(nHtL + nLtH)
2 w

  w:
F will prefer the latter policy if and only if
nFL   1
nFL
< nFL
tH (nH + nL   1) (nHtL   (nH   1) tH)
(nHtL + nLtH)
2 : (24)
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Since
@RHS (24)
@tH
=  nHtL (nH + nL   1) (nH (2tH   tL) + (nL   2) tH)
(nHtL + nLtH)
3
is negative,15 for inequality (24) to be true it must at least hold for tH = tL.
Inserting tH = tL into (24) yields
nFL   1
nFL
<
nFL (nH + nL   1)
(nH + nL)
2 :
Note that the RHS is decreasing in nH : @@nH

nH+nL 1
(nH+nL)
2

=   (nH+nL 2)
(nH+nL)
3 < 0
as nH + nL  4. Inserting the best possible case16 nH = 1 into the last
inequality gives
nFL   1
nFL
<
nFL (nFL + nF^L)
(1 + nFL + nF^L)
2 :
Further, note that
@
@nF^L
 
nFL + nF^L
(1 + nFL + nF^L)
2
!
=   nF^L + nFL   1
(nF^L + nFL + 1)
3 < 0:
Therefore, plugging nF^L = 1 into the last inequality leads to
nFL   1
nFL
<
nFL (nFL + 1)
(2 + nFL)
2 , n2FL < 2;
which contradicts nFL  2. Thus, F will not prefer to open its career system
for external hires if nFH = 0.
15Note that we must have nL  2 since each rm consists of at least two workers at the
lower hierarchy level and since nFH = 0, which implies nFL  2 and, hence, nL  2.
16Recall from the beginning of the proof that we can exclude nH = 0.
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